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Abstract  
This editorial discusses the potential short, and long-run macroeconomic impacts of Covid-19 in 
India, presents early evidence of some of these effects and examines policy issues that would be 
important in the coming days. Since the Indian economy was experiencing sluggish growth on the 
eve of the Covid-19 outbreak, the economic downturn could be severe, and the policy intervention 
would require a careful weighing of options and priorities. Given that policy space and resources 
are limited, policies that help manage the short-run crisis and yield significant long-run benefits 
should receive serious consideration. 
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Introduction 
On 31 December 2019, Wuhan Municipal Health 
Commission in China reported a cluster of cases 
of pneumonia—the first reported cases of what 
later came to be known as Coronavirus disease 
2019 or Covid-19. In the wake of rising infection, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) declared 
it a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020, and a 
pandemic on 11 March. According to the WHO 
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, by 
the first day of summer 2020 in the northern 
hemisphere, that is, 21  June, more than 8.7 
million people were infected by Covid-19, and 
about 5.3 per cent of them lost their lives.1  
In India, the first confirmed case of Covid-19 
infection was detected on 30 January in the state 
of Kerala. India began taking precautionary 
measures early on. For example, thermal 
screening of passengers arriving from China was 
introduced on 21   January, initially at seven 
airports. It was later expanded to more airports 
and passengers arriving from Thailand, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, 
Nepal, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia as well. 
By early to mid-March, the government had 
drawn up plans to deal with a worsening of the 
pandemic in the country.  On 3 March, the Indian 
government stopped issuing new visas and 
suspended previously issued visas for the 
nationals of Italy, Iran, South Korea, and Japan. 
Compulsory screening of all international 
passengers arriving in India was announced the 
next day. On 13 March, all visas, except for 
diplomatic and other official visas, as well as the 
visa-free travel for Overseas Citizens of India 
were suspended. Indians returning from Covid-
19 affected countries were asked to be 
quarantined for 14 days. By 16 March, all land 
borders with neighbouring countries were 
closed for passenger traffic. On 17 March, 
the Government of India issued an advisory, 
                                                            
1 Based on updates available at:  
https://covid19.who.int/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIss_qttCU6gIV0sDACh3NpgJBEAAYASAAEgKMZvD_BwE (accessed on 21 
June  2020). 
2 The data are available from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MHFW) website: https://www.mohfw.gov.in/ 
(accessed on 20 June, 2020).  
urging all Indian states to take social 
distancing measures as a preventive strategy for 
implementation till 31 March.  
The government soon realised the economic 
fallout of all these restrictions and announced 
the formation of the Covid-19 Economic 
Response Task Force. The government also 
announced complete lockdown in selective 
districts and cities where confirmed cases were 
reported. On 21 March, the Prime Minister 
announced the first phase of nation-wide 
lockdown for 21 days to contain the pandemic. 
Later, this lockdown was extended till 3 May 
with conditional relaxations in areas with a lower 
spread from 20 April. This lockdown was further 
extended twice until 17 and 31 May respectively. 
The first phase of lockdown was successful in the 
sense that the doubling rate had slowed to six 
days from the earlier figure of three days by 6 
April. 
However, the prolonged lockdown led the 
economy to unsustainable inactivity, and the 
government decided to open it in a phased 
manner, a process christened Unlock 1. Under 
this, the government divided the districts across 
the country into Red Zone (Hotspots with high 
doubling rate and a high number of active cases), 
Orange Zone (non-hotspots, districts with fewer 
cases), and Green Zone (districts with no 
confirmed cases or no new cases in last 21 days). 
Lockdown was extended till 30 June in the 
containment zones and activities were allowed 
to resume in a phased manner, starting from 8 
June in other zones. 
By the end of the fourth phase of nation-wide 
lockdown on 31 May, the total confirmed cases 
were 182,143, and the total deaths were 5,164, 
according to the data published by the Ministry 
of Health and Family Welfare.2 These numbers 
more than doubled to 410,461 and 13,254 in 21 
days after the lockdown was over. India now 
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ranks fourth in the number of confirmed cases 
and eighth in fatalities from Covid-19 (3.2 per 
cent against the world average of 5.3 per cent).   
The ongoing health crisis and the resultant 
disruption of economic activities have had and 
will continue to have impacts on the Indian 
economy. This study discusses the potential 
short and long-run macroeconomic impacts of 
Covid-19 in India, presents early evidence of 
some of these effects, and examines policy 
issues that would be important in the coming 
days. Since the Indian economy was 
experiencing a slowdown going into the Covid-
19 outbreak, the economic downturn is likely to 
be severe, and the policy intervention would 
require a careful weighing of options and 
priorities. The study argues that given the limited 
policy space and resources, policies that help 
manage the short-run crisis and yield significant 
long-run benefits should receive serious 
consideration.  
The remaining of the study is organised as 
follows. The next section discusses how Covid-19 
fits the definition of a macroeconomic shock. A 
discussion on the state of the Indian economy on 
the eve of the Covid-19 outbreak is included in 
the section following this. Using a simple 
macroeconomic model framework, the next 
section discusses the potential short and long-
run impacts of Covid-19 shock. It also presents 
fragmentary early evidence of some of the 
effects. The policy issues are discussed in the 
penultimate section. It also includes a brief 
discussion of the current government measures. 
The final section revisits the key rationale of the 
study and outlines concluding remarks.  
A Global Pandemic as a Macroeconomic Shock   
Any disturbance that has large-scale 
unpredictable impacts on the economy is 
referred to as a macroeconomic shock. Some 
economists argue that a shock has to be 
exogenous, that is, it must originate outside the 
economic system.3 Although a shock could be 
positive or negative, people pay more attention 
                                                            
3 For a relatively recent detailed discussion on 
macroeconomic shocks, how they are identified, and how 
they propagate, please read Ramey (2016).   
to a negative shock as it leads to undesirable 
economic consequences for individuals as well 
as societies. The outbreak of Covid-19 fits the 
definition of a negative macroeconomic shock.  
As evidence of human to human transmission of 
Covid-19 surfaced, ‘social distancing’ became 
necessary to prevent the spread of potentially 
fatal illness caused by this novel virus. Since the 
three different ways of minimising the health 
risk from this pathogen— development of a 
vaccine (vaccines) to prevent its spread;  
development of drugs to effectively treat its 
infection;  and people acquiring herd immunity 
— take time, avoiding physical proximity became 
the only way of handling this public health crisis 
in the short-run. Acting upon the opinions and 
advice of the scientists and public health experts, 
governments around the world imposed 
restrictive measures of various degrees, 
including complete lockdown to facilitate social 
distancing. These restrictions have disrupted 
economic activities with potential large-scale 
economic impacts. 
The macroeconomic literature devotes 
substantial research efforts to investigate and 
understand the propagation of macroeconomic 
shocks. However, the nature of the shock (that 
may vary widely), the complexity of 
interrelations and the dynamic interactions 
among different agents and parts of the 
economic system may lead to very different 
outcomes. The unknown nature of a 
macroeconomic shock makes it hard to foresee 
and predict its short-run and long-run effects in 
a precise manner. Even the most sophisticated 
models have to rely on a number of 
assumptions, and consequently, the realisation 
of their predictions is predicated upon the 
validity of those assumptions which may or may 
not hold. Despite these caveats, the general 
macroeconomic model framework provides 
some insights into how the Covid-19 
macroeconomic shock may play out for the 
Indian economy.  
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The State of the Indian Economy on the Eve of 
Covid-19 Outbreak 
In order to assess the impacts of the Covid-19 
shock and to consider policy measures, it is 
extremely important to take stock of the state of 
the economy on the eve of the outbreak. It is 
widely acknowledged that the Indian economy 
slowed down significantly during 2018-19.4 
According to Subramanian and Felman (2019), 
trouble brewed as early as the immediate 
aftermath of the global financial crisis when 
export growth slowed and the infrastructure 
investment boom that started in the mid-2000s 
went sour leading to a twin balance sheet crisis 
involving banks and infrastructure companies. 
They argue that despite these problems and 
temporary adverse shocks of demonetisation 
and introduction of goods and services tax (GST), 
Indian economy continued to grow primarily due 
to the income effect of low world oil prices and 
the credit boom led by non-bank financial 
companies (NBFCs). However, the real estate 
bubble that resulted eventually burst in 2019. 
This provides a backdrop for the economic 
impacts of Covid-19 to play out in India and 
current and future policy initiatives must take 
cognisance of these underlying conditions. 5       
Let us take a look at some of the common 
measures used to evaluate the overall health of 
an economy. 6  As Figure 1 shows, the annual 
growth rate of real GDP continuously declined 
since its peak in the first quarter of 2018. The 
real GDP increased by only 3.1 per cent in the 
first quarter of 2020 over the corresponding 
quarter of 2019. While the outbreak and the 
measures to prevent it in the month of March 
may have been partially responsible for this 
significant dip in the growth rate, the declining 
trend that started much earlier indicates serious 
problems elsewhere that had already been 
weakening the economy. This performance of 
the economy can be further evaluated by looking 
at the changes in various components on the 
                                                            
4 There were extensive national and international media 
reports on India’s economic slowdown during the later 
half of 2019 (e.g. Chakravarty 2019; Sharma 2019)  
5 This is different for, say, the United States. When the 
pandemic hit, the US economy was in very strong 
expenditure side as well as on the production 
side (that is, the demand and the supply side). 
On the expenditure side, private consumption 
spending increased only by 2.7 per cent over the 
first quarter of 2019 and this growth is 
substantially lower than the growth rate of 6.6 
per cent in the fourth quarter of 2019. 
Inventories were growing at half of a percentage 
as compared to a growth rate of 1.1 per cent in 
the previous quarter. This also indicates that 
firms were downsizing production in expectation 
of low future demand. The gross fixed capital 
formation fell by 6.5 per cent over 2019:Q1. This 
suggests a larger decline in business investment 
than a decline of 5.2% in 2019:Q4. India also 
experienced significant decline in international 
trade: exports fell by 8.5 per cent and imports by 
7 per cent (MOSPI 2020). 
On the production side, both manufacturing and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  e x p e r i e n c e d  d e c l i n e : 
manufacturing value-added fell by 1.4 per cent 
over 2019:Q1 and construction by 2.2 per cent. 
Note that during the fourth quarter of 2019, 
manufacturing declined by less than one per 
cent and construction did not grow at all. Among 
the sectors that experienced growth, 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing grew by 5.9 per 
cent, and mining and quarrying grew by 5.2 per 
cent. Both sectors experienced some 
acceleration in growth. Utility services grew at 
4.5 per cent compared to its decline of 0.7 per 
cent in the previous quarter. Among other 
services, trade, hotels, and transportation grew 
by 2.6 per cent, a decline from 4.3 per cent 
during 2019:Q4, and finance and real estate 
grew by 2.4 per cent as against its growth of 3.3 
per cent during the previous quarter. Of course, 
public administration and defence in the 
government sector grew the most, by 10.1 per 
cent, which is slightly lower than the growth of 
10.9 per cent in the previous quarter (MOSPI 
2020). Obviously, manufacturing and 
construction were the trouble spots that are 
position with historic low monthly unemployment rate of 
3.6%. 
6 Dev and Sengupta (2020) give a more detailed account 
of the state of the economy before Covid-19 struck. 
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related to the problems we discussed at the 
beginning of this section. 
 
Figure 1: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP in India: 2012:Q2 – 2020:Q1 
Source: Created using data downloaded from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation, Government of India (http://mospi.nic.in/data, accessed on 20 June, 2020). 
 
Figure 2: The Monthly Unemployment Rate in India: November 2018 – May 2020  
Source: Created using the Center for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE) data obtained from Trading 
Economics (https://tradingeconomics.com/india/unemployment-rate, accessed on 19 June, 2020). 
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The decline of economic activities also implies 
slack labour market conditions that are often 
reflected in rising unemployment. According to 
the Center for Monitoring of Indian Economy 
(CMIE), the unemployment rate was on the rise 
prior to the pandemic. As Figure 2 shows, 
unemployment rate steadily increased from 7.2 
per cent in January to 8.7 per cent in March 2020 
and then, quite expectedly, jumped to 23.5 per 
cent in April and May when the entire country 
was under lockdown, and economic activities 
were severely disrupted. If the numbers of 
underemployment and discouraged workers are 
added to the number of unemployed, the labour 
market situation would be even grimmer.  
 
Figure 3: The Annual Rate of Inflation in India—January 2014 – March 2020 
Source: Created using data downloaded from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation, Government of India (http://164.100.34.62:8080/TimeSeries_2012.aspx, 
accessed on 20 June, 2020) 
The rate of inflation, another measure of the 
overall health of the economy, increased 
significantly during 2019. For quite some time, 
particularly after the adoption of inflation 
targeting monetary policy strategy in 2014, 
India’s consumer price index (CPI) inflation more 
or less remained within the target band of 2 – 6 
per cent. Compared to the immediate aftermath 
of the global financial crisis, CPI inflation was on 
a downward trend as we see in Figure 3. Due to 
a number of push and pull factors and market 
imperfections, it is sometimes difficult to see 
what drives inflation in a country like India. 
However, in a crisis like the present, inflation 
should remain dormant so that the central bank 
has some flexibility to go for accommodative 
monetary policy. That the sharp increase in 
inflation has somewhat dissipated on the eve of 
the Covid-19 outbreak is a relief. A fall in world 
oil prices and an overall decline in demand may 
have helped this. 
Some other indicators are worth looking at as we 
try to think about policy interventions for 
moderating economic impacts and recovering 
from the disaster that the economy is inevitably 
heading towards. Two such indicators are the 
government budget and the size of public debt. 
Figure 4(a) shows that government budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP jumped by more 
than a percentage point from the fiscal year of 
2018-19 to 2019-20. Increased government 
spending and reduced tax revenue during the 
last fiscal year have contributed to this 
significant fiscal gap. The recent budget deficit 
has already breached the target of 3 per cent set 
in the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management (FRBM) Act of 2003. The 
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outstanding public debt as a percentage of GDP 
has been rising since 2014, although it has not 
reached the level during the global financial 
crisis. 
By March 2019, India’s non-performing loan 
ratio stood at 9.1 per cent, a decline from 11.2 
per cent a year ago (Figure 5(a)).7 This ratio, an 
important indicator of financial sector health, 
reached an all-time high of 14.7 per cent in 
March 1999 and a record low of 2.3 per cent in 
March 2011. In recent years, an inadequately 
capitalised banking system has accumulated 
high levels of non-performing assets (NPAs), 
including loans creating significant risk in the 
financial sector. The government and RBI have 
initiated a number of vigilance and regulatory 
measures to contain this risk. However, these 
steps have led to risk-averse behaviour of the 
banks in the credit market and, consequently, 
commercial credit has significantly declined. In a 
slowing economy, this is detrimental because 
the economy does not receive the much-needed 
demand stimulus.  
  
(a)Government Budget Deficit as a % of GDP (b)Outstanding public debt as a % of GDP 
Figure 4. Government Budget Deficit and Public Debt in India: 2005-06 – 2019-20 
Source: Created using data obtained from Trading Economics 
(https://tradingeconomics.com/india/government-budget and 
https://tradingeconomics.com/india/government-debt-to-gdp , accessed on 19 June, 2020) 
As Figure 5(b) shows, the stock market 
witnessed significant drop and volatility in the 
major indices during February and March 2020. 
On 23 March the SENSEX fell 4000 points 
(13.15%), and NSE NIFTY fell 1150 points 
(12.98%) reflecting the worst losses in history. 
However, the market rebounded one day after 
the Prime Minister announced a complete 21-
day lockdown on 24 March and SENSEX posted 
its most significant gains in 11 years, adding a 
value of INR (₹)4.7 trillion (US$66 billion) for 
investors. In April and May, the Indian market 
primarily responded to the developments in the 
US stock market, which was by then comforted 
by the monetary accommodations of the Federal 
                                                            
7 Nonperforming loans are defined as loans overdue 
for more than 90 days. 
Reserve. The venture capital for start-ups fell by 
50% in 2020:Q1 from 2019:Q4  
On the international front, the current account 
deficit as a share of GDP has been rising since 
2016. However, on capital account, India has 
been receiving substantial foreign direct 
investment (FDI) even in March. The Indian 
rupee weakened significantly against the US 
dollar during March and has been relatively 
stable since then. The strong foreign exchange 
reserve position (over US$500 billion) is 
definitely a strength of India’s international 
monetary position.  
Overall, the state of the Indian economy on the 
eve of the Covid-19 crisis was weak. It has 
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increased the vulnerability of various segments 
of the economy and indeed increased the 
burden on the policymakers who will have to 
tread a delicate path of careful policy making for 
a relatively quick recovery with minimal costs 
and maximum long-run benefits.   
  
(a) Non-performing Loans Ratio (b) Daily SENSEX Stock Index 
23June, 2019 – 19June, 2020 
Figure 5: Non-performing commercial bank loan ratio (2005 – 2019) and stock price 
Sources: (a) was created using the Reserve Bank of India data obtained from CEIC Data. 
(https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/charts/ipc_india_non-performing-loans-
ratio/?type=column&from=1998-03-01&to=2019-03-01&lang=en, accessed on 19 June, 2020.) 
(b) was created by Trading Economics using NSE data 
(https://tradingeconomics.com/india/stock-market, accessed on 21 June, 2020) 
Macroeconomic Impacts of the Covid-19 Shock 
The outbreak of Covid-19 has led to economy-
wide disruptions not only in India but also in 
most countries around the world. However, it 
will not be until much after this global contagion 
is over that we will be able to have a 
comprehensive assessment of the extent of 
damage to the economy due to this pandemic. 
The complexity of modern economic systems, 
the concurrent events — related and unrelated 
to the outbreak and their dynamic interactions 
would shape up the net effects for the economy 
as a whole. It is almost impossible to anticipate 
all that could or would happen and therefore, to 
have reliable predictions. Even after the episode 
is over, it would be difficult to clearly delineate 
the effects of Covid-19 from those due to 
confounding events. However, the 
macroeconomic models that we use to explain 
the short and long-run behaviour of the 
economy may provide some guidance on what 
                                                            
8 Any introductory level macroeconomics textbook 
includes an exposition of aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply framework. 
we can expect from the disruptions created by 
the Covid-19 shock.  
Theoretically Plausible Effects 
Short-run Effects 
Thinking in terms of the simple but widely used 
aggregate demand-aggregate supply model 
framework, we can see that this shock will affect 
both demand and supply side of the economy.8 
Due to the restrictions, consumption has 
declined. New investments have not been 
undertaken, inventories have been used up, and 
international demand for goods and services 
produced in India has declined. Some of the 
government expenses may have been cut while 
others have been ramped up to fight the 
coronavirus outbreak and to provide economic 
viability to various stakeholders during the 
lockdown. Overall, it is fair to expect significant 
shrinkage in aggregate demand due to the 
pandemic.  
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On the supply side, as production was shut down 
for more than two months, there has been a 
substantial drop in aggregate supply. Thus, one 
would expect a significant decline in the quantity 
of goods and services in the short run. That also 
implies that unemployment would rise. What 
happens to prices is not clear from this simple 
model framework. We can say that it would 
depend on the relative size of the shrinkages in 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply. If 
aggregate demand declines relatively more than 
does aggregate supply, prices will fall. This does 
not necessarily translate into a deflation, but we 
can expect low inflation. However, if the decline 
in aggregate supply is relatively larger, there may 
be inflationary pressure. While it is hard to 
anticipate which scenario will play out, it is safe 
to say that if the restrictions on economic 
activities have to be prolonged and, as a result, 
production does not take place or it does only 
partially, the second scenario is a more likely 
outcome. 
Long-run Effects 
The long-run impacts of this macroeconomic 
disturbance are primarily related to the 
disruptions in accumulation of both physical and 
human capital. As business investment declines, 
the stock of physical capital does not grow as 
much as it should, and it hurts long-run growth. 
Similarly, as the educational institutions have 
been closed, there has been a disruption in the 
process of human capital accumulation as well. 
The excessive stress on the healthcare system 
due to the fight against Covid-19 may also have 
a negative effect on people’s health, another 
component of human capital. However, because 
of the complex interactions of several factors 
such as reduced pollution, increased hygiene, 
dangerous plights of the migrant population etc., 
the net impact on human capital accumulation 
through health outcome is nuanced and would 
require more careful investigation afterwards.  
There are other channels through which this 
episode may affect the Indian economy in the 
long-run. Because of reduced income, some 
people will be using up their savings, and others 
                                                            
9 The plight of the migrant workers has been extensively 
reported in the media. For example, see Pandey (2020).  
will not be able to save as much. Overall, the 
total savings in the economy are likely to drop. 
For the overall economy, savings are essential 
for financing investment. Thus, the decrease in 
savings will also lead to lower capital 
accumulation which is likely to slow long-run 
growth. 
Further, various measures to fight Covid-19 at all 
levels, including economic recovery efforts, will 
cost the governments dearly. With reduced tax 
earning, the government budget deficit is going 
to rise. As the government borrows to finance its 
deficit, interest rate rises, and it crowds out 
private investment – the diversion of private 
savings from the financing of private investment 
to that of government deficit. While a larger 
budget deficit may be a necessity in the short 
run, its persistence for a prolonged period may 
be harmful to the country’s long-run growth. 
There is another way the country’s physical 
capital accumulation and long-run growth may 
be hurt. The construction of all kinds (various 
infrastructure projects, commercial and 
residential buildings) in megacities and large 
urban growth centres is heavily dependent on 
the labour of migrant workers. In the wake of the 
nation-wide lockdown, millions of those workers 
were left stranded and jobless. Media reports on 
their plight abound.9 Most of these workers 
returned to their home states. If a large portion 
of these workers decide not to go back 
immediately, the construction projects may be 
indefinitely delayed or permanently stalled. This 
will hurt long-run growth. However, a well-
thought-out fiscal stimulus with increased 
government spending on infrastructure projects 
with a focus on economically backward states — 
that also send most of the migrant workers to 
the growth centres — could potentially reduce 
the economic stress of those workers and, by 
improving the infrastructure, may lead to more 
regionally balanced growth.       
The closure of educational institutions not only 
disrupts human capital formation but may also 
lead to economic inequality in the long-run. For 
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many in the rural areas and from low 
socioeconomic background, education provided 
through the public education system – although 
not perfect – is the only way and opportunity for 
upward socioeconomic mobility. The 
psychological and economic stress created by 
the pandemic and lockdown may draw a full stop 
to the academic endeavours of a large number 
of such students across the country eliminating 
the possibility of climbing the ladder of upward 
mobility. 
Crises also lay bare the deficiencies in a system 
and create opportunities for innovative thinking 
to mend those lacunas and for making 
permanent changes. In India, many parts of the 
socioeconomic, political, and legal system 
operate according to and using archaic ideology, 
technology, administrative and legislative 
procedures that are simply not appropriate for 
the twenty -first century. If both public and 
private parties take this opportunity to change at 
least a few things to improve public health, 
general education, the supply chain, and the 
social safety net, they may have positive long-
run impacts. 
Early Evidence  
Since it takes a while for the data collection 
agencies to collect, compile, and publish data, 
we would not know the full extent of the short-
run economic impacts of Covid-19 in measurable 
quantities. With people cutting back their 
expenses on non-essential items, businesses 
stalling investment activities, and international 
demand being low, aggregate demand is likely to 
remain subdued for quite some time. Production 
activities have been suspended for almost three 
months. Consequently, by May 2020, about 140 
million jobs were lost, and the unemployment 
rate rose to about 24 per cent. Educational 
institutions are closed for a prolonged period of 
time. The sectors that were the hardest hit due 
to the restrictions include transportation, travel, 
and tourism. Strict restrictions on all modes of 
transportation for an extended period of time 
have pushed some companies in these sectors to 
the verge of collapse.  
                                                            
10 Reported by Christi (2020) in The Indian Express. 
March and April are the harvesting months. Due 
to the shortage of workers during the lockdown, 
some farmers could not harvest their crops, and 
they were wasted. According to one study, “10% 
of farmers could not harvest their crop in the 
past month, and 60% of those who did harvest 
reported a yield loss”.10 India’s food supply chain 
is heavily dependent on manual workers. The 
imposition of social distancing norms and 
lockdown severely disrupted and created stress 
for the supply chain.  
There has been a significant decline in India’s 
fuel demand. According to an International 
Energy Agency report, India’s fuel consumption 
will decline by 5.6 per cent in 2020.  There has 
been an increase in the demand for cooking gas, 
spurred partly by the provision of three months 
of free liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for below 
poverty line (BPL) families announced as a part 
of the assistance package during the lockdown. 
According to a report, the demand increased by 
20 per cent in the month of April (Bhaskar 2020).  
The stock market has been responding to the 
messages that have been discerned from 
domestic as well as international events, 
including the unfolding of the outbreak and its 
toll on human life. The volatility of the market 
indicates noises and a lack of clarity in the 
system. India’s sovereign credit rating has been 
downgraded by most major rating agencies. 
Although this may adversely affect India’s ability 
to borrow in the international market, the fact 
that most countries are in similar situations it is 
ultimately how India manages the crisis in next 
few months and years will determine its standing 
in the international debt and capital market. 
State governments have suspended capital 
works and cut spending on developmental 
schemes. Some state governments had to cut 
the salaries of their employees. With little 
revenue coming in, the state governments are 
likely to face tremendous financial stress. 
Differences in the fiscal health of the states and 
their policy responses may widen regional 
disparities. However, prudent policy choices by 
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states on the lower spectrum of development 
distribution may also help them bridge the gaps. 
There have been some positive developments 
due to nation-wide lockdown as well. For 
example, there have been reports that air 
pollution has gone down significantly in 
megacities like Delhi (see, for example, Slater 
2020). Similarly, due to restrictions on road 
travel and transportation, traffic accidents and 
road fatalities have decreased substantially 
(Wallen 2020). Of course, travel, transportation 
and other economic activities have now 
resumed slowly, and it is hard to predict how 
long these positive effects last.  
As we see, there is fragmentary evidence of the 
effects of the Covid-19 outbreak. As the data 
becomes available, we will have a more 
comprehensive picture of the macroeconomic 
impacts. 
Policy Issues  
Starting on 21 March, the Government of India 
and state governments announced and 
implemented various financial and economic 
assistance programs for targeted sectors or 
groups: the health sector, the poor, the farmers, 
the unorganised as well as the organised sector, 
and the state governments. These packages 
were to provide funds for infrastructure 
building, support to stressed businesses, direct 
cash transfer, and collateral-free loans. Some 
state governments announced their own 
assistance programmes.11 The Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI), through its  monetary policy and 
other crisis management tools, tried to mitigate 
the financial and monetary system stresses. 
Among the measures the central bank 
announced, it reduced the repo and reverse 
repo rates and provided liquidity of INR (₹ )3.74 
trillion (US$52 billion) to the financial system. In 
order to relieve fiscal stress of the state 
governments, RBI announced ways and means 
advances (WMA) and other short-term liquidity 
to those governments. It relaxed repatriation 
limits to exporters, provided special finance to 
the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
                                                            
11 Dev and Sengupta (2020) presents a critical appraisal of 
these measures pointing out to several inadequacies. 
Development (NABARD), Small Industries 
Development Bank of India (SIDBI), National 
Housing Bank (NHB), and Export and Import 
(EXIM) Bank to help the respective sectors these 
banks serve. To provide relief to the borrowers 
at the time of reduced income, RBI put equated 
monthly instalments (EMIs) on hold for three 
months. The overarching goal of these targeted 
programs was to provide short-term relief and to 
reduce stress among the groups that are 
perceived to be most vulnerable in the wake of 
the considerable uncertainty brought upon them 
by this unexpected event.  
On 12 May, the Prime Minister announced a INR 
(₹) 20 trillion (US$280 billion) stimulus package, 
equivalent to 10% of India’s GDP. This includes 
the previous government packages as well as the 
total liquidity of INR (₹) 8 trillion provided by RBI, 
which accounted for about 40% of the package. 
The Prime Minister articulated a vision of 
Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-reliant India) with a 
focus on increasing domestic production, taking 
advantage of the opportunity created by the 
coronavirus crisis.  
The economy has undoubtedly suffered a 
tremendous setback during more than two 
months of nation-wide lockdown under four 
phases. As the economy reopens under Unlock 
1, the number of cases is also on the rise. It is 
unlikely that all economic activities will resume 
to their full capacity soon. With no vaccine yet in 
sight and no definitive cure, the unknown and 
uncertainty about the health risk of the virus will 
linger for a while. It will undoubtedly affect 
economic agents’ financial and economic 
decision- making ability with consequences for 
short and long-run evolution of the economy. 
Broadly, the goals of any fiscal and monetary 
policy intervention would be (i) to get the 
economy out of the woods, that is, to manage 
the short-run crisis, and (ii) to take it back to the 
sustained growth path. To achieve these goals, 
these interventions should: 
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 provide for the necessary means to fight 
the pandemic and minimise the loss of 
life   
 provide for the most vulnerable sections 
of the society 
 help agriculture and allied activities; and 
micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(MSME) get through the crisis. Given that 
these sectors are vital for employment 
generation and also more vulnerable, 
providing help to weather the storm 
should be a priority 
 make sure that the well-behaved large 
enterprises can get through the crisis 
 ensure monetary and financial stability 
by providing liquidity and incentives to 
the banks so that they get the money out 
in the system. The current risk aversion 
of the banks in the wake of increased 
regulation and vigilance put RBI in a 
tough spot as the central bank has to 
choose between relaxing regulation and 
losing the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in providing liquidity to the 
financial and economic system    
 ensure financial sustainability of the 
state and local governments 
 send clear signals to the potential 
international lenders that although the 
country may have to give up the fiscal 
discipline to manage the crisis in the 
short-run, it will regain its fiscal order 
rather quickly. It may be challenging to 
convince them as India’s recent record 
has not been up to the mark. 
Given the extent of the potential damages to the 
economy, it will be costly. However, the 
policymakers need to recognise that resources 
are extremely scarce. First, the government 
revenue earnings from tax and public sector 
enterprises have declined and, given the 
disruptions to the economy, they will decline 
even further. Second, there are limits to 
borrowing. Because of the pervasive nature of 
the crisis, private savings are down, and this may 
be limiting how much the government can 
borrow. It is important to note that the 
household saving rate (household saving as a 
percentage of GDP) has been declining over the 
years. According to the RBI, this rate declined 
from 23.6 per cent in 2011-12 to 18.2 per cent in 
2018-19 (RBI 2020, p. 36). Furthermore, this 
pandemic has affected most economies around 
the world, thus reducing the available funds for 
borrowing internationally. This may be further 
restricted by the downgrading of India’s 
sovereign credit rating. Finally, the Covid-19 
pandemic has hit the US and other advanced 
economies really hard. With their economies in 
crises – and also given the current geopolitical 
situation – it is unlikely that there will be 
significant external help. As discussed before, 
the risk-aversion of the commercial banks in 
response to the government (RBI) regulations in 
recent years may also have restricted the policy 
space.    
Given these limitations, the policymakers need 
to consider the tradeoffs carefully and make 
prudent choices. In particular, they should give 
serious thoughts to options that combine short-
run crisis management goal with long-run 
benefits to the economy. 
Conclusion 
As the Covid-19 outbreak unfolds in India and 
across the globe, the economy continues to 
suffer. We would not know the full extent of the 
damage until much after the pandemic is over. 
The duration of the outbreak, the restrictive and 
preventive measures, together with a whole 
host of other factors, will determine the overall 
impact. It is almost certain that it will take India 
to a deep recession with a significant decline in 
gross domestic product and very high 
unemployment. How the impacts play out in the 
long run will depend on the changes people and 
businesses make and the policy responses of the 
government. Given the limited nature of 
available resources and other limitations, the 
policymakers in India have to carefully weigh the 
policy options and choose those that have the 
largest payoffs in the short as well as long-run.   
References  
Bhaskar, U. (2020, 22 April ). Domestic cooking 
gas demand spikes in April during lockdown. 
livemint. 
(https://www.livemint.com/industry/energy/in
Nath. Space and Culture, India 2020, 8:1  Page | 13 
dia-s-domestic-cooking-gas-demand-spikes-in-
april-during-lockdown-11587483472044.html, 
accessed on 21 June 2020) 
Chakravarty, P. (2019, 27 August). Viewpoint: 
How serious is India’s economic slowdown? BBC 
News. (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
india-49470466, accessed on 21 June 2020) 
Chishti, Seema (2020, 22 May). “New Research: 
How lockdown has impacted Indian farmers, 
their yields”. The Indian Express. 
(https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/h
ow-coronavirus-lockdown-has-impacted-indian-
farmers-their-yields-6421569/, accessed on 21 
June 2020) 
Dev, S. M. and Sengupta, R. (2020). Covid-19: 
Impact on the Indian Economy Working Paper 
WP-2020-013. Mumbai (India): Indira Gandhi 
Institute of Development Research, Mumbai. 
MOSPI (2020). National Accounts Data, Ministry 
of Statistics and Programme Implementation 
Website. (http://www.mospi.gov.in/data, 
accessed on 19 June 2020) 
Pandey, G. (2020, 22 April ) Coronavirus in 
India: Desperate migrant workers trapped in 
lockdown. BBC News. 
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-
52360757, accessed on 21 June 2020) 
Ramey, V.A. (2016). Macroeconomic Shocks and 
Their Propagation. In Taylor, J. B. and Uhlig, H. 
(eds.) Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 2, Ch. 
2, 71-162. New York: Elsevier. 
RBI (2020). Monetary Policy Report, April 2020. 
Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India. 
(https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/P
DFs/MPRAPRIL2020E3D4AD8245734F27B6C568
8F22B4FA2F.PDF, accessed on 21 June 2020) 
Sharma, S.N. (2019, 1 December). Severe 
slowdown: When will the Indian economy 




how/printarticle/72310684.cms, accessed on 21 
June 2020) 
Slater, J. (2020, 11 April) In India, life under 





a311-adb1344719a9_story.html, accessed on 
21 June 2020) 
Subramanian, A. and Felman, J.  (2019). India’s 
Great Slowdown: What Happened? What’s the 
Way Out?  CID Faculty Working Paper No. 370. 
Cambridge, MA: The Center for International 
Development at Harvard University. 
Wallen, J. (2020, 1 May). Overall fatalities in 




coronavirus-outbreak/, accessed on 21 June 
2020) 
Acknowledgements 
This article is partially based on my webinar 
presentation at the Two-Day Online Workshop 
on Impact of COVID-19 on Indian Economy with 
Special Reference to Assam organized by the 
Department of Economics, Bodoland University, 
Kokrajhar, India, on June 6-7, 2020. I would like 
to thank Professor Manjit Das, Dr. Sijousa 
Basumatary, and the participants for their 






                              
